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PHRONESIS part 5
Efferent Information Processing, Ethics, and the Categories of Action
Abstract: Over centuries, philosophers have theorised about what constitutes ‘the good’  regarding 
behavioural choice. Characteristically, these attempts have tried to decipher the nature and substantive 
values that link the apparent trichotomous nature of the human psyche, variously articulated in terms of 
human reasoning, feeling, and desiring. Of the three, most emphasis has focused on the unique human 
characteristic of reasoned behavioural choice in terms of its relationship to the emotions. This article 
determines the principle dynamics behind 'ethical' behaviour: In the nervous system, efferent nerves, 
otherwise known as motor neurones, carry nerve impulses away from the central nervous system to effectors 
such as muscles. A great deal of neural activity underpins‘efferent information processing’. What follows is a 
categorisation of the structure of 'efferent information processing' in a manner, that enhances our 
understanding of the attempts of philosophers, from Plato to Russell, to explain ‘what it is to be behave 
well’.
Introduction
To understand ethics, first and foremost, is to understand behavioural choice. It is not, primarily, to consider 
or evaluate what it is right to do, or what it is to lead a good life. 
Ultimately, behavioural choices are made. Only after this is understood, can one be drawn to contemplate the 
nature of what it is best to do. In this secondary endeavour one tries to determine what, why, and to whom a 
particular behaviour is of benefit. Such considerations lead to judgments about, or to the apportioning of 
value to behavioural positions. Their purpose is to grant individuals an equitable or stable behavioural and 
contemplative stance i.e. to secure a moral identity and subsequently, to create the foundations for principles 
of ideology.
This notion that ethics is about behavioural choice rather than about making judgments as to what behaviours 
are right or wrong presents a problem of efficacy, for what then, is it "to be ethical". To be ethical, is 
commonly regarded as meaning; to be consistent with agreed principles of correct moral conduct i.e. Being 
ethical is about behavioural evaluation and judgement. Alternatively, I suggest that to be ethical is to apply 
due consideration. 
What does it entail to apply due consideration to behaviour choice?
Overview - Historic perspectives
Over centuries, philosophers have theorised about the relevant benefits of particular moral and behavioural 
stances and attempted to identify principles that explain behavioural choice. Characteristically, these 
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attempts have tried to decipher the nature and substantive values that link the apparent, trichotomous nature 
of the human psyche, variously articulated in terms of human reasoning, feeling, and desiring. Of the three, 
most emphasis has focused on the unique human characteristic of reasoned behavioural choice in terms of its 
relationship to the emotions. Much less thought is given to primitive desires that respond to the basic bodily 
needs and functions:
In ‘The Republic’, Plato suggests that through the main social classes there correspond three parts of the 
soul, those being, reason, spirit, and desire. Desire corresponds with the basic appetites of, for example, 
hunger, thirst, and sex. The spirit of emotion or the ‘act of being spirited’ includes such things as anger, 
conscience, and shame. Reason is that cognitive process that rules spirit through self-control and strength of 
will, and inhibits desire to its basic physical requirements. In Plato’s trichotomy of influences, a good 
individual is one that promotes the harmonious relation between these three aspects of the human soul, with 
reason ruling over spirit and self-control inhibiting desire to its essential physical requirements. 
In contrast to Plato and central to Aristotle’s ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ (from Nicomachean Ethics) is the thesis 
that explores the mean between excess and deficiency through an attempt to determine a more inclusive 
relation between reason and feeling. Whilst the ‘Platonic’ position emphasises the inhibition of feelings 
through reason presenting an antagonism of the two, Aristotle gives credence to feeling when its expression 
is 'more or less' appropriate to the situation. 
Hume maintains a relational stance between reason and feeling in ‘Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals’: Through reason, humans have the capacity to relate their feeling experiences with other individuals. 
This relation imbues them with a unique sense of ‘sympathy’ and sense of humanity. It is this sense of 
sympathy that enables humans to formulate the concept of what constitutes virtuous behaviour and 
consequently, to prescribe moral judgements. However, Hume’s account indirectly usurps the role of feeling 
in morality, because in his account, sympathy is a construct of reasoned assertions about feeling. This stance 
enables Hume to conceive of the notion of fixed general moral standards founded on objective utilitarian 
qualities, which effectively subjugate the operation of one’s sympathy. In this view, as sympathy is a 
recognitional construct or some form of emotional empathy, the acknowledgement of its sentiments are 
merely a respectful nod in the direction of human desires and passions. 
In ‘Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals’, Kant excludes all consideration of the individual 
human’s inclinations and feelings in favour of a concept that emphasises duty bound actions, which for him 
are a formal requirement in respect of moral law and pure reason. Kant's position makes requisite, the denial 
of the needs of the individual self in respect to the benefit of others and of society as a whole. 
In contrast, Mill's ‘Utilitarianism’ commits to the view that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote unhappiness, where happiness constitutes pleasures in 
absence of pain and vice versa. In order to counter arguments that such a view of life would propose that 
there is no higher end than pleasure, Mill distinguishes between higher and lower pleasures. He draws a 
distinction between the "qualities" or hierarchies of pleasures: “Human beings have faculties more elevated 
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than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness 
which does not include their gratification.” (Chap II, para 4). Consequently, Mill acknowledges the spirits 
and desires of man, but much like Plato, regards them as subservient to the 'higher' reasoning pleasures of 
creative, literary, artistic, and intellectual enquiry. 
Both Freud and Nietzsche view morality as a mechanism of repression. For Nietzsche, this repression is 
societal, where morality serves to rationalise and legitimate the institutions of the social classes. For Freud, 
morality is an internal compensatory response to the frustrations of desire. With both these contrasting views, 
the symptom of morality is interpreted as a negative constraint on the needs and desires of the individual. 
These views express an antagonism between the reasoning behind moral ideals and the emotive needs and 
desires of the individual. In Nietzsche’s view, our moral choices are an attempt to impose our will on the 
external world. In Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis, the moral conscience or ’super-ego’, is an internalisation 
of external authority. The ‘id’ is our impulsive desires and wants. The rational ‘ego’, is that which attempts to 
exact a balance between the impractical hedonism of the id and the unattainable ideal of the super-ego. 
In the 20th century, Russell (1935) espouses the idea that when it comes to judgements about whether one or 
other moral stance is good, the lack of rational evidence either way calls for any given stance to appeal to the 
emotions and to employ the kind of rhetoric that will arouse similar emotions in others. For Russell, the 
question of ‘values’ lies outside the domain of reasoned knowledge so that when we assert that something 
has ‘value’, we are giving expression to our own emotions and not to a fact which would still be true if our 
personal feelings were different. Consequently, an ethical stance in Russell’s view is not one whose primary 
function is to convey knowledge. Rather, his emotivist stance presents ethical discourse as an essentially 
non-rational activity whose language tends toward the expression and evocation of feelings and emotions. 
Richard Hare concludes in ‘The Language of Morals’ (1952), that any given moral reasoning must ultimately 
commit to a morality premise than cannot be empirically verified. This requires the commitment to a 
‘decision of principle’ that is not founded on a statement of truth or fact, but rather requires our sentiments 
and passions to motivate. In other words, human reasoning is an incomplete stratagem to ethical conclusion 
and that the demand for behavioural conclusions befall the defensive insecurities of the passions for 
temporary resolution.
Philippa Foot (1958/9) adds further consideration and weight to the importance of basic human needs by 
suggesting that purely innate universal desires and physical requirements demand of humans to seek those 
conditions that maintain ‘good’ physical health and functioning – There is a call to satisfy ones basic needs, 
like for example, avoiding physical injury. Similarly, and at the other end of the scale, there are other human 
needs like the need for a sense of meaning in ones life, or for the need to care for family and the wider social 
group, or to feel that one is making a valuable contribution or providing a good service to others. These 
aspirations come to define our concepts of virtuous behaviour and endeavour, both to the cause of self-
interest and to the functioning of a healthy body and society. 
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When reviewing the catalogue of opinions that philosophers have expressed over the centuries, it is unclear 
that there is a viable ‘dialectical’ Hegelian reduction of possible alternatives, which might enable us to 
achieve a new and more informed understanding as to how mankind might prioritise behaviour when there is 
conflict of reason, feeling, and desire. Assessing reason in the absence of feeling is a form of applied logic 
and in being so is devoid of ‘sensitivity’, whilst feeling without reason is devoid of any ‘civilised’ reference 
points and explanation. In conclusion, this brief historical exposition reveals no principles to clarify the 
nature of behavioural evaluation. We are left to muse over the relative value of the trichotomy of influences 
in the selection of behavioural choice.
The trichotomous nature of behavioural choice
Looking at their contributions, it is notable that philosophers appear not to contest the trichotomous nature of 
human behaviour choice. These might be paraphrased as follows:
1. Humans have a call to act to satisfy bodily needs - their raw innate needs and desires.
2. Humans too, like many other animals, possess feelings and emotions that are powerful at eliciting 
behavioural responses.
3. Finally, humans alone can call upon powers of reason to guide their behaviour. In doing so, they are 
able to assess the potential merits of conflicting needs and reach an informed decision as to which is a 
preferred course of action.
Philosophers also recognise that in choosing to act, humans are faced with a trichotomy of influences that are 
competing and vying for expression. The problem, therefore, has been in identifying underlying principles. 
Without such principles, we are simply hostages to and often victims of popularised or emotive rhetoric. It is 
little comfort that we must rely on our intuitions and faiths in order to make behavioural decisions, which we 
might reason and believe to be ethical.
The relevance of Hierarchical Systems Theory to the trichotomy of influences
In providing a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, Pharoah (2007) details three distinct systems 
categories. These three categories coincidentally, align with the trichotomy of behavioural influences thereby 
providing philosophers with the coherent principles that reveal the underlying dynamics of behavioural 
choice?
1. What does HST's first of three systems categories explain about innate desires? 
Organisms evolve over generations and in the process, develop bio-chemical and bio-mechanical diversity. 
4
What is the purpose of bio-diversity? 
Hypothetically, for any given system structure, the cessation of bio-diversity would be indicative of an 
exceptional adaptive state. Such an all-embracing structural state would arise only if there were no active 
potential to drive further structural adaptation. That there is continuous bio-diversity, therefore, is reason to 
conclude that the ultimate objective of bio-diversity and of evolving organic systems is to continue adapting 
until an absolute all-embracing structural adaptation be realised; whatever that realisation might be. 
Any given bio-diverse organism represents, therefore, a transitional state: It is a product of evolution and its 
systems structure will continue evolving further. Being a product of evolution, an organism's transitional 
state is a physiological expression that embodies and is a product of all its previous environmental 
adaptations. Consequently, all replicated physiological structures are a legitimate interpretative proposition 
of an all-embracing structural adaptation.
How do these principles of Hierarchical Systems Theory relate to ethics?
Adaptive physiological structures are what determine innate activities and behaviours. In other words, any 
call to action is determined by innate environmental adaptations. These behaviours are the observable actions 
that express a system's interpretive proposition of an ultimate and all-embracing systems state. 
At any given moment, an organic structure may have numerous innate intentions competing for behavioural 
expression. Their combined function is prescriptive of the system's interpretative version of what it is to be 
an absolutely stable state.
All animals, including humans, possess innate calls to action. These calls to act are prescriptive of evolved 
innate neural and biochemical mechanisms. The neural mechanisms are part of the 'efferent information 
processing network'.
2. What does HST's second of three systems categories explain about feeling?
When an individual organism assimilates environmental experience on a realtime basis, it is capable of 
expressing behaviours that are adaptive. However, there is no compulsion to adapt behaviour if past and 
present interpretations of experience are identical and where there is no impetus that might promote the 
reappraisal of behavioural responses. Conversely, there is a compulsion to adapt behaviour if interpretations 
of past and present experiences do differ. Realtime varying interpretations of experience demand behavioural 
reappraisal.
The neural processes involved in the reappraisal of past interpretations of experience generate an experiential 
sensation. This sensation is the phenomenon known as 'feeling'. Thus, following its experiential 
interpretations, an animal is compelled to adapt behaviour through the evocation of its feelings.
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How is feeling relevant to ethics?
Through the evocation of feelings, the many sensations of experience are what guide the behavioural 
decisions of animals. Inevitably, experience generates a continuous narrative of changing sensations 
competing for behavioural expression. In addition to this narrative, innate desires also seek behavioural 
resolution. From this dichotomous conflict their ensues a juxtaposition of competing value: The value 
associated with an all-embracing structural adaptation and that of an all-embracing behavioural adaptation. 
Additionally, the evolution of both innate structural adaptations and capabilities associated with behavioural 
adaptation are intimately entwined. They compete for behavioural expression leading to complex 
behavioural and physiological characteristics.
Hierarchical Systems Theory tells us that humans have no analytic access to the processes that generate their 
phenomena of feeling but that feelings do call them to action. Additionally, innate desires call humans to act. 
Both have a significant impact on a determined choice of action. Typically, the feelings experienced are 
given the term 'emotions'. Note however, that emotions are conceptual interpretations of feeling types and 
are, consequently, not equivalent. Emotions are just a convenient way of referencing different classes of 
feelings. But feelings, like colours, come in infinitely subtle shades and hues.
3. What does HST's third of three systems categories explain about reasoning?
Whilst the relationships of contextual experience generate an individual organism's feeling, Hierarchical 
Systems Theory explains that the relationships of conceptual realisations are what generate an individual 
human's reasoning.
It is a requirement that any conceptual construct be stable. This is so, because any individual's concept of 
reality includes the essence of the concept of themselves - An unstable conceptual construct is fundamentally 
objectionable to the individual experiencing it. 
Despite this powerful requirement for a stability, an individual's thought processes are compelled to 
reappraise its conceptual construct when its concept of reality is demonstrably recognised as being in conflict 
or inconsistent with reality. Notably, the reappraising of thought processes appear to the individual, only to 
apply processes of reason. This appearance, though, is false because practical reasoning itself is no more than 
the instrument of action for the reappraisal of conceptualised reality. Reasoning is merely a process by-
product. In practice therefore, human reasoning, however powerful its logic, will avoid mental propositions 
that do not support an individual's concept of reality - Individuals would rather twist reason than allow it to 
alter their conceptualisation of reality.
Within these parameters, humans have the motivation to act according to what each individual "reasons" is 
supportive of their concept of reality, where reasoning is not intrinsically a faculty of logic or truth. Reason is 
presently the highest known dynamic of influence in ethical discourse. But note, like learning, reason is a by-
product of a more fundamental systems process. This process, which is the guardian to reason, demands a 
stable concept of reality however biased that process is required to be.
Processes of reason and logic are complex, sometimes counterintuitive and conflicting. Additionally, an 
individual's motivation to act according to reason is further mitigated by their spirit of feeling and their 
innate desires. Each separate function has it own behavioural agenda. When individual humans have cause to 
act, these trichotomy of influences bear down. Without conceptual knowledge of these influences, the 
individual is facing a cocktail of unknown values and aesthetic consequences. 
Unlike the processes that lead to feeling and innate desire, conceptual processes are open to analytical 
access. That the reasoning which humans attribute to those analytical processes seem unassailable means that 
human give great bearing on the calls to action that are based on reason. But should humans uphold the value 
of the conceptual decision above those calls to action that are generated by feelings and innate desires?
How should humans evaluate what is the 'right' cause to action?
The evaluation of what is 'right'
We have a broad articulation of the trichotomous nature of the human psyche that is involved in behavioural 
choice. Humans possess desires, feelings, and concepts: The physiologically innate needs, the emotions that 
we conceive to understand through their association with our feelings, and finally the concepts that we 
maintain with reasoning. Each plays out to a different and sometimes conflicting tune. 
It is evident that none of the trichotomy of influences is submissive by default. Despite this, for hundreds of 
years, there has been considerable bias to the view that decisions founded on reason are the higher moral 
aspiration.
Why is this the case?
One might desire water in a desert, but to deny another of a precious water resource that one carries on one's 
person would 'not be consistent' with one's concept of what it is to be human (i.e. where 'what it is to be 
human', is a concept integral to one's concept of self). It is a painful realisation when one's reasoning tells 
one to give away some water to another, however during the reasoning process, such a stance will reinforce a 
sense of moral ideology which is consistent with one's elected stable concept of reality. Conversely, to deny 
another of water and retain a water resource for one's own exclusive consumption is reasoned as basal: To do 
so, is to deny a sense of humanity in order to feed a core thirst desire. To deny water from a humanitarian 
perspective requires the rejection and then reappraisal of an initial and potent concept of self. Such denial 
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seems dark or cold. Is it any wonder that philosophers have continued to bias in favour of reason as their 
founding principles to morality. To do otherwise is to be forced to dismantle and realign their concepts 
regarding self and reality. In conclusion, it seems 'morally' preferable to deny core needs than to deny the 
self. Why? Because our concepts of reality and of self are constructed from reason and not from our 
emotions or desires.
On the justification of behaviours
On occasion, when I have walked into my living room, I have found my dog ‘Impy’, curled up on the sofa. 
Impy knows the sofa is out of bounds and before I have made any utterance, he looks at me sheepishly with 
head lowered, sagging droopy eyes glancing up at mine as he climbs carefully and slowly down with his tail 
between legs, back curving downward. 
I might conclude that he displays in this manner because he feels 'guilty' for having sat where he knows he is 
not allowed. However, his behaviour cannot be attributed to his own ‘sense of duty’ or to his evaluation of 
what is 'right and wrong'. Whilst he is undoubtedly experiencing something, it is I that is tempted to attribute 
what he is experiencing to the emotion humans call ‘guilt’. Nevertheless, one can reason that he is 
experiencing the feelings that humans attribute to guilt. 
Of course, words like 'guilt' are emotive terms. Such terms are our human way of conceptualising and then 
verbalising about the phenomenon of feelings which we experience and interpret. Humans attribute many 
emotions to the phenomenon of feeling, but note, these attributions entail conceptual reasoning. 
Analysing guilt
The feeling that humans attribute to the emotion of guilt relates to the enforced appeasement of self-interest. 
Its roots lie in the dynamics of a social hierarchy where dominance affects social status and with it, mating, 
feeding, preening, and sheltering opportunities. Arguably, societal dynamics that lead to feelings of guilt 
have an objective purpose:
Animals have to make decisions that, one can reason, effectively amount to the assessment of self-interest. 
My dog’s interest is to sit on the comfort of a sofa. This is in conflict with his recognition that I am dominant 
in our ‘family/pack group’ and I demand his appeasement through the rule of ‘not sitting on the sofa’. But he 
will attempt to get away with any behaviours that service his interests and will display regret, when caught 
out, for violating individual and group authority. Interestingly, Impy does not think, ‘sitting on the sofa will 
disrupt the dynamics of my family group’. He thinks only of servicing his own interests, which are a matter 
of weighing up the need for comfort with the desire not to be chastised. The decision that my dog is to make 
is quasi-moral - The decision depends on his assessment of the merits of his desires and feelings, and do not 
include the merits of a stable concept of reality. 
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On the other hand, the dominant animal’s interests are frequently serviced simply by the minor’s 
appeasement display. This apparent ‘remorseful’ appeasement is usually justice enough for the dominant 
because it reaffirms the demands that are implicit in the nature of the social hierarchy. However, such 
appeasement is not really indicative of the recognition of ‘remorse’. The behaviour is not indicative of the 
presence of ‘the concept’ of emotional ‘regret’, which the appeasing animal experiences and is 
communicating. Rather, it is simply an expression of a feeling, which only humans are able to recognise to 
be characteristics of remorse and whose associated behaviours tend to mitigate the harm that could be 
inflicted by the dominant one. 
A distinction between emotion and feeling
Looking further at the distinction between the feelings of animals and those of humans, for nonhuman 
animals in this example, the pursuit of self-interest is mitigated by what transpires to be, the benefits of 
group interaction. Effectively, animals make decisions, which, if they were human, could be interpreted as 
moral or ethical - in this example; the denial of self-interests for the benefit of the group. For humans, guilt is 
the conceptualised description of a feeling; a description that embraces the fullness of the feeling's 
experiential contexts. 
This explanation clarifies just one of many types of feelings that animals experience. It is difficult to argue 
with any conviction that feelings and experiences such as joy, fear, surprise, sadness, anticipation, wonder, 
disappointment, remorse, and jealousy are the preserve of humans alone. Nevertheless, to interpret such 
feelings as ‘emotions’, is to apply human conceptions that apportion descriptive terms of value and relation 
to feeling phenomena. A nonhuman animal does not place terms of value and relation to feelings - Feelings 
are experienced and that is the end of it. There is no contextual conception for animals.
Whilst feeling and behaviour has factual function for all animals, the tendency of every human individual’s 
creative reasoning capability is to play a game that entails describing terms of reference to those feelings and 
from that, formulating the individual’s evaluative moral identity. The nature of this game causes doubt and 
confusion because the dynamics of the mechanism of our feelings remain outside of our conceptual analysis 
- conceptual analysis is confined to relational interpretations or inferences between what is felt and what is 
objectively experienced. 
Whilst humans obey the same principles of self-interest and social dynamics, they are unique in having the 
capability of analytical creativity. They are able to question, evaluate, and apply reasoned concepts to 
emotive responses: So I might ask, "Is it fair to get off the sofa because someone senior to me tells me to? 
What are the reasons? What are the arguments that I might pursue to maintain my self-interests over the 
group? What are the benefits, risks, or alternatives available to me?" There is a complex misappropriation of 
the core instincts in humans that would normally drive their animalistic behaviours. Humans disassociate 
feelings from their related emotions by using faculties of reason. Humans can re-evaluate their self-interests, 
their sense of duty, and manipulate. The behavioural choices that humans make are determined by weighing 
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up juxtaposed feelings and interpreting their emotions with complex conceptions of individual, social, and 
environmental consideration. In this manner, they assess the nature of value and lend credence to their sense 
of judgment and to their chosen ideology and course of action. 
The Principle of Relational Ethics
The reason why I introduced my dog was to indicate a relationship between the human concept of morality 
and non-articulated nonhuman feelings and behaviours. From the simple organisms to the most complex, 
there are evolving if not understood directives behind behaviour. One might argue, quite reasonably, that 
there is justification behind the behaviour of systems that are not even alive; for do not those that pursue the 
fundamental principles of physics seek the 'laws' that appear to qualify, and thereby 'justify', all systems’ 
behaviours? 
Similarly, moralising is a process that seeks to apply laws that mean to justify human behavioural choice. 
But what are the principles of morality with which to make these judgments?
Recognising the trichotomy of influences and the nature of their dynamic relationships enables certain 
conclusions to be drawn. For example, one can state that
1.1. Reasoning is a by-product of the processes that maintain conceptual reality.
2.2. Consequently, there is nothing implicitly moral about decisions derived from reason.
3.3. Therefore, every possible behavioural consideration from the trichotomy of influences should be 
assessed on its own merits and understood on its own terms in the evaluation of choice.
4.4. Individuals will defend with absolute conviction, by verbal, physical, and all possible means, the 
reasoning that purports to service their stable concept of reality, however ideologically or personally 
twisted it may have become.
We cannot rely on our reason to establish any fundamental moral positions. This is because reason is a 
function of our desire for a stable concept of reality and is subject to the accuracy of that concept. This 
explains why there are as many moral stances as there are concepts of reality. All 'bad acts' are validated by 
the proponents of that action; if their concept of reality provides the reasoning to validate it - Any 
individual's concept of reality can easily become twisted by circumstance.
If we cannot use reason to gauge the quality of our moral stance, what are we to do to determine fundamental 
or universal moral principles?
On the evolution of morality 
Reasoning tends to be highly regard because of its assumed basis in logic - Individuals do not see themselves 
as acting or thinking illogically. This is because human behavioural decisions utilise reason in a manner such 
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that it maintains compliance with the individual's concept of reality.  That concept 'has to make sense'. In this 
way, reasoning appears to be at the heart of decision making, but in truth, is a slave to the individual's 
concept of reality as it develops from one moment to the next. The apparent logic of reason is flawed. 
Reason is but a subservient by-product.
If one is to accept the devaluation of reason in this manner, what can one conclude is morality if anymore 
than a human construct designed to institute compliance with stabilising conceptualised values? 
One might legitimately argue that morality is no more than a human construct to validate dogmatic 
conceptual ideals. One might believe that there can be no more depth to morality than that it aligns to general 
principles relating to our 'sense' of humanity. Should one conclude that there is no moral high ground to 
which man might aspire?
Whilst behavioural choice is determined by fundamental principles relating to the trichotomy of influences, 
morality is an entirely different discourse:
The substance of moral subjectivity
Hierarchical Systems Theory informs us that the process of conceptualising reality is what enables an 
individual to become aware of their consciousness. In this regard, a concept is not necessarily a verbal 
statement but is formed by the systematic interpretation of understandings in terms of the relationship 
between learning and experience. Because of the relationship between conceptualisation and consciousness, 
the process of trying to locate and uphold a moral imperative through conceptual realisation, is formative in 
the evolution of an individual's consciousness. In other words, seeking the correct call to action affects the 
essence of an individual's consciousness.
In this manner, morality is an aspirational process that determines the nature of the evolution of individual 
consciousnesses and that also influences all those conscious entities with whom every individual has contact.
The essence of conscious experience is evolving in reaction to the development or in reaction to the 
discovery, of what one might term 'universal moral principles'. These in turn, modulate our concepts about 
the world in which we live. Thus, we can expect morality to evolve as an intrinsic element of our conscious 
experience. 
Is morality the intrinsic property of consciousness in all its forms? Does relating ethics to Hierarchical 
Systems Theory create a relationship between physical properties and the intrinsic property of 
consciousness?
There is no reason to suppose that the trichotomy of influences is all there is to decision making. After all, 
before humans evolved, there was no trichotomy. Instead there was only a dichotomy of influences. 
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According to Hierarchical Systems Theory, there will be further evolutionary stages that will eclipse our 
current ethical motivations. The proposition therefore, is that there is an ethical viewpoint and ultimately, a 
vision of morality that will overshadow all current human understanding.s
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